A general framework of partial cooperation and shareholding interlocks in oligopolies is first introduced, and then the best responses of the firms are determined. The monotonic dependence of the equilibrium industry output on the cooperation levels of the firms is proved. Conditions are given for the local asymptotic stability of the equilibrium which require sufficiently small speed of adjustments. Antitrust thresholds are then introduced into the model which may result in the loss of equilibrium or in the presence of multiple equilibria. The dynamic behavior of the associated dynamic models with adaptive output adjustments also becomes more complex: period-2 cycles may emerge and coexist with stationary states.
Introduction
Cournot oligopolies are the most frequently discussed economic models in the literature of mathematical economics. This research area was originated by Cournot (1838) , and based on his pioneering work, many scientists have introduced and examined the different variants of the classical Cournot model. A A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t comprehensive summary of earlier works is given in Okuguchi (1976) and their multiproduct extensions and some applications are presented in Okuguchi and Szidarovszky (1999) . The most frequently discussed extensions are singleproduct models with product differentiation, multi-product oligopolies, labormanaged and rent-seeking games. The existence and uniqueness of the equilibria was the central research issue in the earlier years, and later the attention of scientists has been turned to the dynamic variants of these models. The asymptotic behavior of dynamic oligopolies became the main focus, first in the linear case and later nonlinearities have been introduced into the models. In most studies the total profits or the profits per labor units were the payoff functions of the firms, and no cooperation among the firms was assumed. In the noncooperative case the Nash-equilibrium is the solution of the static game and in most cases it is the steady state of the dynamic extensions. The equilibrium is a strategy vector such that no firm can improve its own payoff by unilaterally diverting from the equilibrium. However, the firms might be able to increase their payoffs by simultaneously moving away from the equilibrium, as it is well known in the case of prisoners' dilemma. Any simultaneous move of the firms requires some level of coordination, so some kind of cooperative effort has to be assumed. The cooperation of the firms may take many different forms, including information sharing, side payments, profit sharing, shareholding interlocks to mention a few. Cyert and DeGroot (1973) introduced the concept of partial cooperation, when each firm's payoff function is the sum of its own profit and certain proportions of the profits of its competitors. Chiarella and Szidarovszky (2005) examined dynamic oligopolies with partially cooperating firms under continuous time scales, their main focus was the loss of stability in the case of information delay. One common way to achieve partial cooperation is by cross shareholding.
The literature has considered the cross shareholding from different points of view. While Berglof and Perotti (1994) and Arikawa and Kato (2004) consider cross shareholding effect in terms of corporate governance, Flath (1991 Flath ( , 1992 and Merlone (2001) proved some results in terms of cartelizing effects. Different profit formulations are considered when studying the collusive effects of cross-shareholding, see for instance Reynolds and Snapp (1986) and Flath (1992) . Merlone (2007) introduces a different profit formulation and gives a common form to the different profit formulations which is similar to the partial cooperation described in Bischi et al. (2008) . In this paper we will introduce a general framework that includes partial cooperation and different models of shareholding interlock. We will examine the dependence of the equilibrium on model parameters and the asymptotic properties of the dynamic extensions under discrete time scales. The structure of the paper is the following. The general model will be introduced in Section 2 and the best responses of the firms will be determined. In Section 3 we will investigate the dependence of the equilibrium on model parameters, and the local dynamic behavior of the corresponding dynamic ex-A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t tensions will be discussed and illustrated in Section 4. Models with antitrust threshold will be introduced in Section 5 and global asymptotics will be investigated in Section 6. The last section concludes the paper.
The General Mathematical Model
Consider an n-firm single-product oligopoly without product differentiation. Oligopolies with product differentiation and with multi-product firms can be discussed in a similar way. Let x k be the output of firm k, p( n l=1 x l ) the inverse demand function and C k (x k ) the cost function of firm k. Then the profit of this firm can be given as the difference of its revenue and cost:
Assume first that the firms partially cooperate in the sense of Cyert and DeGroot (1973) and that γ kl denotes the cooperation level of firm k toward any other firm l. Then it is assumed that the payoff of firm k is given as
where in addition to its own profit, firm k takes certain proportions of the profits of its competitors into account. It is usually assumed that γ kl ≥ 0 for all k and l, and l =k γ kl ≤ 1. However there are other cases when these conditions are violated (e.g. overhelping or damaging other firms).
Following the formulations used in the literature, we can formulate four different models for describing shareholding interlocks. Snapp (1982, 1986) propose and analyze two profit formulations. In the first case joint ventures are considered and the payoff of firm k is given as
where δ kl is the ownership interest of firm k in firm l. The ownership interest of firm l in firm k is represented in the first term by δ lk . We also notice that k Π k = k ϕ k , so this formulation well represents profit sharing among the firms. Clearly, the multiplier of ϕ k is positive, so maximizing (3) is equivalent to maximizing function (2) with
M a n u s c r i p t
The other formulation they propose assumes partial equity interests, then the payoff of firm k has the form
which is the same as (2) with γ kl = δ kl . In their analysis Reynolds and Snapp (1982) compare models (3) and (5) and claim that in the second formulation the manager of each firm considers its own interests in the other firms, even if they "are blind to the ownership by rivals". They validate this assumption for two reasons. First, they assume that these investments are too small to convey control and so the rivals have very small or no control on the business decisions. Second, since the firms are unaware of the interdependent nature of their output decisions, they are also unaware of the effects on the rivals of their claims on other firms profits.
If indirect shareholding (Flath 1991 (Flath , 1992 ) is assumed, then the payoff of firm k has the form
in which it is assumed that firm k maximizes its profit that includes its operating earnings ϕ k and its return on equity holding in the other firms. We can easily rewrite equation (6) in the special form of (2) by introducing matrix D = (δ kl ) with δ kk = 0 for all k, and vectors ϕ = (ϕ k ) and Π = (Π k ). Equation (6) can be written in vector-matrix form as
from which we conclude that
Since l =k δ kl < 1 for all k, matrix I − D has unit diagonal elements, nonpositive off-diagonal elements, and it is an M-matrix (see for example, Szidarovszky and Bahill, 1998) . It is also well known that
So the diagonal elements of (I − D)
−1 are greater than or equal to unity. Therefore the inverse matrix exists and is nonnegative. If b kl denotes the (k, l) M a n u s c r i p t
, then (7) has the form
Maximizing this function is equivalent to maximizing (2) with
for all k and l.
More recently, Merlone (2007) , introduced a model considering net indirect shareholding, in which the profit of firm k is
where the gross profit Π G l of the firms are defined implicitly by relations
In this case both operating earnings and equity holdings are netted. We can show that this model is also equivalent to (2). By introducing vector
so from (9) we get expression
where
Simple algebra shows that
M a n u s c r i p t that is, for all firms k,
Maximizing this function is equivalent to maximizing (2) with γ kl given by (8).
As shown in Merlone (2007) , it is possible to summarize the different profit formulations considered in the literature as follows:
operating earning operating earning and equity holding net joint ventures (3) net indirect shareholding (9) gross partial equity interests (5) indirect shareholding (6) Nevertheless, we have proved that with all above formulations firm k maximizes function (2) with certain coefficients γ kl , which are either the cooperation levels of the firms toward their competitors, or the joint ownership interests, or they are given by equation (8) . We note that in the case of partial cooperation the firms consider their payoffs rather than their profits. In fact, their payoffs (2) represent their attitude of each firm towards its competitors by considering proportions of their interests in its own payoff. So in this case it is not necessary to require
In the case of an oligopoly market the payoff of firm k has the form
As it is usual in oligopoly theory, we assume that functions p and C k (k = 1, 2, . . . , n) are twice continuously differentiable, and that
for all k and feasible values of the relevant variables. These are the standard assumptions in the theory of concave oligopolies (Bischi et al., 2008) . Under these conditions
and
so Π k is strictly concave in x k . If firm k has a finite capacity limit L k , then with any fixed values of Q k and S k there is a unique best response of firm k which is denoted by R k (Q k , S k ), and clearly
where x k is the unique solution of the monotonic equation
Assuming interior best response, implicit differentiation shows that
A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
A strategy vector (x * k ) is an equilibrium if and only if for all k,
The existence of an equilibrium is a simple consequence of the Nikaido-Isoda theorem (see for example, Forgo et al., 1999) . The uniqueness of the equilibrium however is not guaranteed in general. Later in Example 3 we will show a case with multiple equilibria. It is well-known that the noncooperative equilibrium is always unique (Bischi et al., 2008) . In order to develop a practical method to determine equilibria we will rewrite the best response functions as functions of the total output of the industry and S k . From (18) we have with
where x k is the unique solution of equation
The derivative of the left hand side with respect to x k is p (Q) − C k (x k ) < 0, so it is strictly decreasing. By assuming interior optimum, implicit differentiation shows, that
In the first two segments R k is constant and is continuous everywhere, so it is also decreasing in both variables Q and S k everywhere.
M a n u s c r i p t
In order to compute the equilibrium we have to solve the nonlinear system of algebraic equations
for unknowns S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n and Q, and then the equilibrium outputs are
are solutions of system (26). By using the monotonicity of the left hand side of equation (26) a monotonic iteration method can be used to solve these equations (see for example, Argyros and Szidarovszky, 1993) .
Dependence of the Equilibrium on Model Parameters
The noncooperative equilibrium is obtained by selecting γ kl = 0 for all k and l, and the totally cooperative equilibrium with γ kl = 1 for all k and l. In the noncooperative case S k = 0 for all firms. Let Q and Q * denote the industry outputs in the noncooperative case and any partial cooperative case, respectively. We will first show that Q * ≤ Q, that is, partial cooperation or shareholding interlocks have a decreasing effect on the equilibrium industry output. In contrary, assume that Q * > Q, then
which is an obvious contradiction.
In order to compare industry equilibrium outputs with different cooperation levels we make the simplifying assumption that γ kl ≡ γ k , that is, each firm treats all of its competitors equally. In this special case we can rewrite the best response expression (22) as follows:
where x * k is the solution of equation
The left hand side of this equation is positive at x k = 0, negative at x k = L k , and is strictly decreasing if we assume the following condition:
for all k and feasible values of the relevant variables. Notice that (C ) is slightly more restrictive than (C). By implicit differentiation,
if we assume in addition to (C ) a weaker version of condition (B), namely
Furthermore
In the first two segments of (27) R k is constant, and it is continuous in its entire domain, therefore it is (not necessarily strictly) decreasing in both variables Q and γ k . We can now show the following result. 
Proof. In contrary, assume that Q
, which is a contradiction.
This result can be interpreted as any increase in the cooperation levels of the firms has a decreasing effect on the industry equilibrium output.
Local Stability Analysis
Assuming discrete time scales and adaptive output adjustments by the firms, the firms are assumed to adjust their outputs according to the dynamic rule
for k = 1, 2, . . . , n, where 0 < K k ≤ 1 is the speed of adjustment of firm k. This scheme is known as partial adjustment towards best responses.
The local asymptotic behavior of this system depends on the eigenvalues of the Jacobian, which can be written as follows:
where we assume that the equilibrium is not on the boundary between the cases of (18). All derivatives are taken at the equilibrium.
By using a slight modification of the proof presented in Chiarella and Szidarovszky (2005) we can show the following result.
Theorem 2 Assume conditions (A), (B ) and (C ) hold, and γ kl ≡ γ k for all firms. Then the equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable if
Remark. From equations (20) and (21) we see that R kQ k + γ k R kS k ∈ (−1, 0], so the denominator of condition (i) is always positive. Therefore conditions (i) and (ii) hold if the speeds of adjustments are sufficiently small. The right hand side of condition (i) is always at least two, so under realistic assumption M a n u s c r i p t on the K k values, (i) always holds. Example 1. Assume linear inverse demand function p(Q) = A − BQ and linear cost functions,
The payoff of firm k is given as
Assuming interior optimum, the first order conditions imply that
with derivatives
The conditions of Theorem 2 have now the following special forms:
which can be rewritten as
The right hand side of (i) is at least 4, so it is always satisfied under realistic conditions. Condition (ii) holds if the K k values are sufficiently small. As a special case assume symmetry, when γ k ≡ γ and K k ≡ K. Then condition (ii) becomes
A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t that is,
In the case of duopoly n = 2, so the right hand side equals 4 3+γ
, which is larger than 1 if γ < 1, so in this special case duopolies are always locally asymptotically stable.
Example 2. Consider next the case of best response dynamics, when K k = 1 for all firms. In this case condition (i) of Theorem 2 is always satisfied, and by introducing the notation
If we let a k = −α k ∈ [0, 1), then this inequality can be rewritten as
Notice that for all k,
, so in the case of duopolies, the equilibrium is always locally asymptotically stable.
Modified Model with Antitrust Threshold
Cartelizing effects of the financial interlocks have been proved in the literature (see, for instance Reynolds and Snapp, 1986 , Flath, 1992 and Merlone, 2001 On the other hand this issue is not ignored by antitrust regulation as Clayton Act 7 forbids the acquisition of the "whole or any part" of the stocks or assets of a corporation where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition.
While a complete analysis of Partial Stock Acquisition can be found in ¶1203 of the multivolume analysis of antitrust principles by Areeda and Hovenkamp (2002) and Hovenkamp (2005) , in the following we are interested in what can be the consequences on the dynamics when Antitrust's possible actions are taken into account.
M a n u s c r i p t
In our approach we assume that firms are concerned that aggregate quantity reduction could attract Antitrust attention. Therefore, in our model we assume that there exists a thresholdQ under which firms are believed to act noncooperatively, so the authorities will not take action against them.
In our model theQ is assumed exogenous and common knowledge for the firms.
These assumptions are modeled by the following dynamic system:
Assume that 
with derivative
so the best response of firm 1 is as follows:
Similarly, the best response of firm 2 is
otherwise.
Assume next partial cooperation among the firms with cooperation levels γ 1 and γ 2 , respectively. Then the payoff of firm 1 is as follows: (41) with derivative
So the best response of firm 1 is given as
otherwise (42) and similarly,
The best response functions are illustrated in Figure 1 if both γ 1 and γ 2 are below unity. The noncooperative best response functions are obtained by selecting γ 1 = γ 2 = 0, so they have similar graphs. If γ 1 or γ 2 is zero, then the best response of the firm with zero cooperation level is the same as the best response function without cooperation. If 0 < γ k ≤ 1 with some k, then the threshold, where the best response becomes zero, decreases, so the best response function in the positive domain also decreases. If at least one of γ 1 and γ 2 is below unity, then there is a unique intercept which is smaller in both coordinates than the noncooperative equilibrium. This gives an illustration of the general result proved in Section 3. Let us investigate the special case of γ 1 = γ 2 = 1 in more detail. Then the slope of the best response function in the positive domain is −1 for both firms, so these lines are either parallel or coincide. If they are parallel, then there is a unique boundary equilibrium (x or y equals zero). If they coincide, then there are infinitely many equilibria.
Fig. 1. Equilibrium with partial cooperation
This is the case when c 1 = c 2 , that is, if the marginal costs of the firms are equal. In this case both firms maximize the common payoff function.
which is a concave parabola in x + y. This function has its maximum under nonnegativity assumption if
otherwise .
So in the case of A ≤ c, x *
= y * = 0 is the only equilibrium, and if A > c, then there are infinitely many equilibria which form the set
If we drop the assumption that γ k ≤ 1, we may have multiple and finitely many equilibria. A such case with sufficiently large values of γ 1 and γ 2 is shown in Figure 2 with three equilibria. Assume now that 0 < γ 1 < 1 and 0 < γ 2 < 1, furthermore
Fig. 2. The case of three equilibria
The noncooperative equilibrium is the intercept of the lines
which is
with total industry output
The partially cooperative equilibrium is the intercept of the lines
A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 
Global Asymptotic Behavior
We now illustrate the global dynamics of the equilibrium in the special case of duopolies with linear price and cost functions, which was discussed earlier in Example 3. For the sake of simplicity the best responses in the noncooperative case are denoted by R N 1 (y) and R N 2 (x) (equation (43) and (44)), and in the partially cooperative case by R C 1 (y) and R C 2 (x) (equations (46) and (47) (48) and (50)).
Let us denote the nonnegative region of (x, y) as Ω and its two subregions Ω N and Ω C , each of which is defined as follows:
The dynamic model with antitrust thresholdQ, that we call the hybrid system, is defined as follows:
The stationary point (x (49) and (51) we know M a n u s c r i p t
Then we have the following results on dynamics.
Theorem 4 The hybrid dynamic system (52) and (53) 
Before proving the theorem some observations are in order. We denote the second equations of (43) and (44) 
By the definition of the locus, it is clear that if
Then we can define the locus of (x, y) such that f
which can be written as
It is also clear that if
By (54) and (55), it can be seen that periodic points of a period-2 cycle, (x I , y I ) and (x II , y II ), must satisfy the following four conditions:
where (x I , y I ) < (x II , y II ) is assumed. The first two conditions imply that the periodic points are fixed points of f
The last two conditions of (56) imply that (x I , y I ) is mapped by the noncooperative system, T
, and (x II , y II ) by the partially cooperative system, T
. These conditions can be reduced tõ In the case ofQ < Q C , Cases (ii) and (iii) can be proved in a similar way as above in which we define the locus of (x, y) as f C 1 (y) + f C 2 (x) =Q and the locus of (x, y) as f
In this case the stationary point with partial cooperation (x C , y C ) becomes the stable point.
In the following figures we illustrate some of the possible dynamics of system (41) in the case of duopoly with inverse demand function p (x + y) = 10 − (x + y), cost functions c 1 (x) = 5x, c 2 (y) = 5y and different cooperation level values. In Figure 3 cooperation values are γ 1 = γ 2 = 0.5 and the two downward sloping straight lines are the reaction functions in the noncooperative case. Antitrust threshold is Q = 3.9. In this case we can observe the coexistence of a stationary state and a period two cycle from the initial states (4.5, 0.2) (1.0, 4.5), respectively. The light area is the basin of the period-2 cycle, and the dark area is the basin of the stationary state.
On the contrary, in Figure 4 all values but the antitrust threshold are the same. In particular, with Q = 3.2, no steady state exists, there is a unique period-2 cycle, and we can see that from the same initial conditions only the period-2 cycle occurs. The two straight lines are y = Q Finally Figure 5 illustrates the special case of γ 1 = γ 2 = 1, where infinitely many equilibria coexist: the steady states are depicted on the down sloping M a n u s c r i p t straight line. There are infinitely many period-2 cycles, and trajectories always converge to one of them depending on the selection of the initial state. M a n u s c r i p t
Conclusion
A general framework of partial cooperation and shareholding interlocks were first introduced resulting in a special payoff structure in which the payoff of each firm is a sum of its profit and a linear combination of the profits of the competitors. The best response functions were then determined and the existence of the equilibrium proved. A simple example illustrates the possibility of multiple equilibria. Conditions were derived for the local asymptotical stability of the equilibria requiring that the speeds of adjustments of the firms be sufficiently small. These results are very similar to those known from the literature for concave, classical Cournot oligopolies.
The introduction of antitrust thresholds create a new situation: the possibility of the loss of equilibrium, and the presence of multiple equilibria. A complete description of the existence and the number of equilibria is presented. The associated dynamic models also show more complex asymptotic behavior. In the case of linear price and cost functions period-2 cycles emerge and they can coexist with stationary states.
The introduction of nonlinear price and cost functions into these models and their analysis is the subject of our future research.
